	Building Name Address		Use ((per FSA Annexed Table 1)	Date and Time of Incident)	Structure and Stories Area		Extent of Damage (Damaged Area/ Total Area)		No. of Casualties
	Atagawa Yamatokan 986-2 Naramoto, Higashi-Izumachi, Kamo-gun, SHIZUOKA		Hotel (5) a	Nov. 19, 1969 Breakout at 00:30 (approx.) Noticed at 00:45 Notified by subscribed telephone Extinguished by 02:00			Fire preventive Partially fire resistant Partially wooden 6 stories above ground and 1 below Building area m ² Total floor area 3,497 m ²		All, Half, Partial, Small 1,983 m² (57 %)		
						5					Fatalities 0
											Injured
						y					14 (3)
Summary	of Fire Inci	dent									
This hotel fire resulted in relatively fewer causalities compared to the other hotel fires because of the early discovery of the fire by the automatic fire detection system and the evacuation efforts promptly made by the hotel staff, despite of the fact that over 90 guests were sleeping in the 3-story wooden building (main building) when flames emerged from a neon sign and the building was completely burned down rapidly in the middle of the night.											
Floor	Total	Damaged	Use		No. of		No. of	Fire	escape	Fi	refighting
	Annexes	area	Purpose)			lataillies	Inside			
	Wooden 232 m ² (2 stories above ground and 0 bel					w)		Slow			xtinguishers
	Wooder	ories above ground and 0 below			w)		descending		Indoor fire		
	Additional building						machine		nydrants		
	Main build	ina	(H)15			10w)		2 sets of fixed		Automatic fire	
4			Observati deck	on	(1)10			ladders per floor 1 rope ladder		Emerç	gency bell
3		1.983	Guest roor	ms, III	(G)45					Guiding lights	
2	1 983		Guest roor	ms,	39		1	set pe	r floor	標	
1	.,	.,	etc. Front des Kitchen Guest roc	k, , ms	7			_	Shori detec safet		circuit tor for fire y
B1			Break roo	m							
Subtotal	1,983	1,983			106						
lotal	3,497	1,983			106		1				
*(H) = Hotel employees, (G) = Guest (Floor, Room, Part, Combustibles, Habitable/Non-habitable Rooms, Present/Absent) The fire emerged from a neon sign (the hotel name) located between the main entrance and balcony of the guest rooms on the 3rd floor of the main building.						or wall was cuit fault due า					
	Summary This hot of the fir of the fa from a n Floor 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5	Buildin Atag Yama 986-2 N 986-2 N Higashi-Kamo Summary of Fire Inci This hotel fire resulte of the fire by the auto of the fire by the auto of the fire by the auto of the fact that over firom a neon sign and Floor Total Annexes Wooder Additional Wooder Additional Wooder Main build 4 3 (2) 1,983 1 B1 Subtotal 1,983 Total 3,497 (Floor, Room, Part, OR Rooms, Present/Abs The fire emerged from between the main end from between the	Building Name Address Building Name Address Building Name Address Balance 986-2 Naramoto, Higashi-Izumachi, Kamo-gun, SHIZUOKA Summary of Fire Incident This hotel fire resulted in relatively of the fire by the automatic fire de of the fact that over 90 guests we from a neon sign and the building Floor Total area Damaged area Ploor Total area Damaged area Vooden 179 m² (2 s Wooden 179 m² (2 s Additional building Wooden 1,103 m² (4 Main building 4 1 3 1,983 2 1,983 1 3 B1 1,983 Subtotal 1,983 1 3,497 Subtotal 1,983 Ingent from a neon sign between the main entrance and b the 3rd floor of the main building.	Building Name Address Use ((per FSA Annexed Table 1) Atagawa Yamatokan Hotel (5) a 986-2 Naramoto, Higashi-Izumachi, Kamo-gun, SHIZUOKA Hotel (5) a Summary of Fire Incident Hotel This hotel fire resulted in relatively fewer causali of the fire by the automatic fire detection system of the fact that over 90 guests were sleeping in t from a neon sign and the building was complete Floor Total area Damaged area Use (Purpose Mooden 179 m² (2 stories above gr Wooden 179 m² (2 stories above gr Wooden 1,103 m² (4 stories above gr Additional building Guest roon Large ha deck 3 1,983 1,983 2 1,983 1,983 1 1,983 1,983 2 1,983 1,983 1 1,983 1,983 1 1,983 1,983 1 1,983 1,983 1 1,983 1,983 1 1,983 1,983 1 1,983 1,983 1 1,983 1,983 1 1,983 1,983 1 1,983 1,983	Building Name Address Use ((per FSA Annexed Table 1) Date (per FSA Annexes Annexes Date (per FSA Annexes Annexes Date (per FSA Annexes Date (per FSA Annexes Date (per FSA (per FSA Annexes Date (per FSA (per FSA	Building Name Address Use (per FSA Annexed Table 1) Date and Time of Incident Atagawa Yamatokan Nov. 19, 1969 Breakout at 0:30 (approx.) 986-2 Naramoto, Higashi-lzumachi, Kamo-gun, SHIZUOKA Hotel Noticed at 00:4 Notified by subscribed telephone Summary of Fire Incident Extinguished b 02:00 Date and Time of Incident This hotel fire resulted in relatively fewer causalities compared to of the fire by the automatic fire detection system and the evacuat of the fact that over 90 guests were sleeping in the 3-story woods from a neon sign and the building was completely burned down r Floor Total Damaged area Use (Purpose) No. of persons Annexes Wooden 179 m² (2 stories above ground and 0 belo Wooden 170 m² (4 stories above ground and 0 belo Main building Guest rooms, 39 etc. Guest rooms, 39 etc. 1 1,983 1,983 106 Total Guest rooms, 39 etc. 106 Total 1 1,983 1,983 106 Total 106 Total 106 Total 1 1,983 1,983 106 Total 106 Total 106 Total	Building Name Address Use (per FSA Annexed Table 1) Date and Time of Incident Atagawa Yamatokan Nov. 19, 1969 Breakout at 00.30 (approx.) Noticed at 00:45 Notified by subscribed telephone Notified by subscribed telephone 986-2 Naramoto, Higashi-lzumachi, Kamo-gun, SHIZUOKA Noticed at 00:45 Notified by subscribed 986-2 Naramoto, Higashi-lzumachi, Kamo-gun, SHIZUOKA Notified by subscribed Extinguished by 02:00 Summary of Fire Incident This hotel fire resulted in relatively fewer causalities compared to the of the fire by the automatic fire detection system and the evacuation of the fact that over 90 guests were sleeping in the 3-story wooden b from a neon sign and the building was completely burned down rapid Annexes Wooden 1232 m² (2 stories above ground and 0 below) Wooden 179 m² (4 stories above ground and 0 below) Additional building (H)15 C 4 Guest rooms, etc. Guest rooms, stores 39 etc. 1 1,983 1,983 106 Subtal 1,983 1,983 106 Total 1,983 106 C 6 106 106 106 7 1,983 1,983 106 <	Building Name Address Use ((per FSA Table 1) Date and Time of Incident Structure Storie Area Atagawa Yamatokan Nov. 19, 1969 Fire prever Partially fir resistant Breakout at 0:30 (approx). Hotel 986-2 Naramoto, Higashi-Izumachi, Kamo-gun, SHIZUOKA Noticed at 00:45 Notified by subscribed telephone Fire prever Partially fir resistant Summary of Fire Incident Total floor a 3,4 Total floor a 3,4 Total floor a 3,4 Summary of Fire Incident Total floor a 3,4 No. of fatalities Total floor a 3,4 Floor Total area Damaged area Use (Purpose) No. of fatalities Floor Total area Damaged area Use (Purpose) No. of fatalities Wooden 179 m² (2 stories above ground and 0 below) Wooden 179 m² (2 stories above ground and 0 below) Main building Wooden 1,103 m² (4 stories above ground and 0 below) Main building Image al deck Image al deck <th>Building Name Address Use (per FSA Table 1) Date and Time of Incident Structure and Stories Area Atagawa Yamatokan Nov. 19, 1969 Fire preventive Partially fire resistant Fire preventive Partially fire resistant 986-2 Naramoto, Higashi-lzumachi, Kamo-gun, SHIZUOKA Hotel (5) a Nov. 19, 1969 Fire preventive Partially wooden 6 stories above ground and 1 below Summary of Fire Incident Notified by subscribed telephone Building area m² This hole fire resulted in relatively fewer causalities compared to the other hotel fires be of the fire by the automatic fire detection system and the evacuation efforts promptly ma of the fact that over 90 guests were sleeping in the 3-story wooden building (main building from a neon sign and the building was completely burned down rapidly in the middle of the area Fire preventive Partially me resistant Floor Total Damaged area Use (Purpose) No. of fatalities Fire equi comptly ma fatalities Mooden 17.103 m² (4 stories above ground and 0 below) Mosent of fatalities Fire fire equi ladder floor 1 1.983 1.983 106 1 2 sets floor Fire fire floor Presumatic fire floor Presumatic floor 1 0 1.983 1.983 106 1</th> <th>Building Name Address Use (per FSA Annexed Table 1) Date and Time of incident Structure and Stories Area Exten Dam (mage Table 1) Atagawa Yamatokan Nov. 19, 1969 Fire preventive Partially fire resistant Fire preventive Partially mooden (sories above ground and 1 below All, H 986-2 Naramoto, Higashi-Lzumachi, Kamo-gun, SHZUOKA Hotel (5) a Noticed at 00:45 Notified by subscribed telephone Building area 3.497 m² Mall, H Summary of Fire Incident Total floor area 3.497 m² m² Total floor area 3.497 m² 1.983 Summary of Fire Incident Extinguished by 02:00 No. of persons No. of fatalities Fire escape fre escape Fire escape Floor Total Damaged read Use (Purpose) No. of persons No. of fatalities Fire escape Vooden 17, 103 1,983 1,983 1.983 Inside stairs Slow Slow 4 Observation deck Guest rooms, sinche 7 Fire escape Inche 4 Observation deck 1 Presumbly, the combustib Rooms, Present/Absent) Presumbly, the combustib Rooms, Present/Absent) Presumbly, the combustib Rooms, Present/Absent)</th> <th>Building Name Address Use (per FSA Armaad Table 1) Date and Time of Incident Structure and Stories Area Extent of Damage Area Atagawa Yamatokan Nov. 19, 1969 Fire preventive Partially wooden (5) a Fire preventive Partially wooden (5) a All, Half, Partial, Small 986-2 Naramoto, Higashi-Izumachi, Kamo-gun, SHCI/OKA Hotel (5) a Nov. 19, 1969 Fire preventive Partially wooden (5) a All, Half, Partial, Small Summary of Fire Incident Hotel (5) a Notified by subscribed telephone Total floor area 3,497 m² All, Half, Partial, Small Summary of Fire Incident Fire resulted in relatively fewer causalities compared to the other hotel fires because of the early of the fire by the automatic fire detection system and the evacuation efforts promptly made by the hotel at the detection system and the evacuation efforts promptly made by the hotel at the detection system and the evacuation efforts promptly made by the hotel at the detection system and the building (main building) when flames e from a neon sign and the building was completely burned down rapidly in the middle of the night. 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Floor Total Damaged area Use (Purpose) No. of persons Fire escape floor Fire escape to below Fire escape tel (2) Fire escape tel (2) Fire escape floor Fire escape tel (2) Fire escape floor Fire escape tel (2) Fire escape floor Fire escape floor

(5) Fire Pronagation Path	(Location of Fire Source) (Propagation from Source) (Exterior neon sign wall where the neon sign was installed	Propagation to Adjacent Zones) (Propagation to Upper Floors) Traveled from the interior wall to the ceiling and from the backside of the ceiling to each guest room					
	The combustible interior wall was ignited by sparks from the short-circuit fault in the neon sign. Flames spread to the ceiling and fully engulfed the 2nd floor of the wooden main building. The flame traveled further via the stairwell and a hole in the collapsed floor (3rd floor).						
	 O Main Reasons for Propagation of the Fire The fire spread instantly because the building was O Smoke Propagation Path The smoke from inside the walls traveled through the stairwells to the 3rd and seended the 3rd and 3rd an	an old wooden structure. he voids inside the walls of the 2nd floor and the backside of the 4th floors.					
П.	Summary of the Building						
(1) Built	Construction, Completion, and Major Renovations (Opened) 1950 (Expansion) Prior to 1959						
Fii	(2) Vertical Shafts	(3) Fire Prevention					
re Preventio	Stairs[X]Duct Spaces[]Elevators[]Pipe Shafts[X]Escalator[]Other (Service lift)[X]	 The hotel had appointed a fire-prevention manager and submitted the paper work to the local fire station. The hotel had no fire defense plan in place. 					
n Mai	No fire compartment	 The hotel organized their in-house firefighting team; however, no fire drill was carried out. The night guard patrol was carried out hourly for the premises. Each room was provided with evacuation information including the escape route and caution notices. The safety information was provided to a large group of guests by the person in charge of the group. 					
nagemen							
•							
	(4) Fire Compartments	(5) Firefighting Equipment					
	The hotel had fire shutters, but these shutters were ineffective because they were left open.	The firefighting equipment was fairly well maintained. The automatic fire detection system detected the fire at an early stage and sounded through the hotel. The indoor fire hydrant was also effectively utilized by the hotel staff who were able to extend the hoses from the main buildings to the annexes to prevent the fire from spreading.					
1							

III.	III. Actions Taken after the Fire was Detected							
(1) First De	° Detected by (Night guard) ° How and why (He saw the sparks) ° Action taken (He alerted his colleagues)							
lected	Around 0:30, Night Guard S who was in the entrance hall of the main building heard a popping sound and saw sparks outside the building. He confirmed sparks were coming from somewhere around the neon sign and made an internal call to the Senior Director on the 4th floor.							
(2) Emergen	Yes [X] (The night guard made a 110 call to the police station) Time elapsed since the discovery () minute Call No []							
cv Call	After Guard S notified the director (4th floor) of the fire, he called the local police outpost (Atagawa outpost) and the company (Atagawa Denki) who installed the neon sign, but no-one answered at the outpost, so he made a 110 call to Shimoda police station. (The police station called the fire station at 00:45.)							
	* While Guard S was talking to Shimoda police station, the automatic fire detection system detected the fire and started to warn the guests, but he turned the alarm bell off a few minutes later to avoid any unnecessary panic among the guests.							
(3) Initial Firefighting Activities	<u>Initiated</u>	Successful [] Failed [X] (Reasons or Conditions) • Extinguished timing [] The Director who was notified of the fire rushed immediately to the origin of the fire with a fire extinguisher; however, his attempts to contain the fire were ineffective because the working range of the extinguisher fell short in reaching the flames on the exterior wall of the 2nd floor.						
	Not initiated	 Extinguished time [] Firefighting difficulties [] Firefighting method [] Other [] 						
(4	(Obstacles or Difficulties in Fire Control)							
) Summar	 By the time the firefighters arrived, the main building was already engulfed in flames, and therefore, they operated defensively to protect the annexes and nearby buildings. 							
v of Firefighting Activities	• The water previously such a vicinity such	essure of the fire hydrant fell short, but fortunately the hotel had abundant resources of water in the as the ocean, river, and water tank.						

(5)	Means of Escape (No. of Persons)	Obstacles to Evacuation					
Evacuation	 Stairs [X]() Elevators/Escalators [] () Escape equipment [X](2) Directly to ground from windows or openings [X Rescued [] () Other ()[]() 	(](2)	 No windows [] Barred openings [] Locked emergency doors (Exits) [] Alarm system [] (Poorly controlled, Malfunctioned, Not installed) Power outage [] Other () [] 				
	 Despite nearly full occupancy of 91 guests in the main building, this fire resulted in relatively few casualties under the circumstances—more casualties could have been expected. This is because of the effective automatic fire detection system and the actions of the hotel staff, who alerted each room and helped the guests to evacuate. From the 3rd floor, 2 guests came down the stairs to the 2nd floor and jumped down from the window of a 2nd-floor guest room to the open-air hot spring bath on the ground. They suffered serious injuries (broken bones). The power was shut off <u>after</u> everybody evacuated the building in order to avoid confusion in dark. 						
(Obstacl	Obstacles to Evenuation					
6) Casualties	Healthy individuals 12 Obstact (Drunk persons) • No w Individuals in need of assistance 1 • Barre Infants • Lock Elderly 1 • Alarr Handicapped • Powe Patients/ill persons • Othe	 No windows [] Barred openings [] Locked emergency doors (Exits) [] Alarm system [] (Poorly controlled, Malfunctioned, Not installed) Power outage [] Other [X] 					
	The only person who was killed in this fire was a female guest (age 65) who was staying on the 3rd floor of the main building. With the help of the hotel staff, she was coming down stairs with her friends; however, against her friends' advice, she went back to her room because she had forgotten something. At some point the heavy smoke probably trapped her because her body was found near the main stairs of the building.						
١V	/. Issues and Lessons Learned						
D	espite challenging conditions (i.e. the wooden hotel w hen all the quests were asleen) this hotel fire resulte	vas fully bo d in relative	oked and the fire occurred in the middle of the night				
1.	1. The night guard discovered the fire at an early stage and carried out the necessary actions.						
2. The automatic fire detection system was activated as designed and sounded throughout the hotel.							
3.	3. The male hotel staff members were staying in the men-only dormitory on the premises of the hotel and they promptly helped the guests to evacuate.						
4.	4. The fire escape equipment was well maintained and the hotel staff were able to utilize them effectively.						
5.	5. The power supply lasted during the evacuation, which avoided confusion.						



1st floor of main building



4th floor of main building



3rd floor of main building