



West Bldg

South Bldg

East Bldg

Building Name Address	Use (as per FSA Annexed Table 1)	Date and Time of Incident	Structure and Stories Area	Extent of Damage (Damaged Area/ Total Area)	No. of Casualties
		Feb. 3, 1970	Fire resistive 10 stories		Fatalities
Tsuruya Hotel	Hotel (5) a	Breakout at 02:00 (approx)	above ground and 1 below Building area 3,208 m <sup>2</sup>	All, Half, <u>Partial</u> , Small	0
6-45		Detected at 03:50 Notified by		2,450 m <sup>2</sup>	Injured
Higashikaigan-cho, Atami, SHIZUOKA		emergency call	Total floor	(10%)	2
		Extinguished by 6:00	area 24,149 m²	(10,0)	(2)

## I. Summary of Fire Incident

(3) Origin of Fire

This resort hotel fire originated from the 9th floor of a 10-story fire-resistive building and burned on the 8th to 10th floors of the building. Although the fire caused no fatalities, it caused significant damage on the upper floors because the fire room did not have a automatic fire detection system. Despite the fire occurring in the top part of a tall building, no fire ladder truck was dispatched. Adelay in discovery and a defect in the floor slab construction caused complete destruction of the upper floors. Although the building had a voluntarily installed sprinkler system on the 10th floor, the sprinkler head

did not work because the fire emerged from the ceiling. Many factors facilitated this fire in spreading.

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(2)	Floo	Total area		Damaged	Use	No. of	No. of	Fire escape	Firefighting		
Con	r				area	(Purpose)	perso ns	fatalities	equipment	equipment	
ditio		m <sup>2</sup>			m <sup>2</sup>		110		4 sets of	56 sets of fire	
(2) Conditions per Floor		East	Wes	st bldg					inside stairs	extinguishers (3rd to 7th floors)	
er		&South								,	
<del>-</del> 100	R	Buildings 166			166	Elevator Main				48 sets of indoor fire hydrants	
_	11	100			100	room				,	
	10	2,006			2006	Grand hall			1	36 sets of fire extinguishers (2nd	
	9	2,318			137	Guestrooms	39			to 4th floors)	
	8	2,303	6	235	141		57			Sprinkler at 10th	
	7	2,303	5	261			38			floor (Grand hall)	
	6	2,310	4	261			27			Incomplete	
	5	2,183	3	261			31			automatic fire	
	4	2,153	2	280			23			detection system	
	3	944	1	282			31			on the East & South Buildings	
	2	2,390	R1	115		Guest rooms,	15			(under	
						Kitchen				construction)	
	1	2,501				Lobby,	Worker	s 79(floors		3 sets of water pipe	
					Games room	unknown)			connections		
	Total	(incl. anne		77 m²)			340	0			
	·=·	24,149		2,450		<u> </u>					

(Floor, Room, Part, Combustibles, Habitable/Non-habitable Rooms, Present/Absent)

The fire emerged from the storage (122.7 m²) at the center of the 9th floor

The circumstances are unknown; however, given the location, there were many combustible materials (tables and cushions) inside the storage room. The fire room floor (steel deck plates) collapsed due to the heat, creating holes through which the fire could spread to lower floors.

Unknown, suspected arson

(4) Cause of Fire

## (5) Fire Propagation Path (Propagation from Source) (Propagation to Lower Floors) (Location of Fire Source) Storage room on Combustible Through holes that emerged in the floor slab that collapsed because of the the 9th floor materials in the fire and the heat produced from the combustible materials (exact location room (Propagation to Upper Floors) unknown) Through a hole (220x60 mm) that had emerged in the ceiling where the duct which had collapsed because of fire and heat had had pierced through the fire-room ceiling. Through holes (35 x 2700 mm) in the ceiling (floor slab of the 10th floor) where the clearances were never sealed off after duct construction. The storage room did not have any automatic fire detection system and no-one was around when the fire emerged. The fire burned the combustible materials inside the storage room and spread to the 10th floor via an exhaust air duct that had pierced through the floor slab of the 10th floor. This duct had fallen and created a hole for the fire to spread upward. The fire also spread through the clearance around the duct, which needed to be sealed off when the construction was completed. In addition, the floor slab (deck plates) of the storage room collapsed because of the heat and created holes for the fire to propagate through to the lower floors. O Main Reasons for Propagation of the Fire O There was no automatic fire detection system and no-one was in the room, which delayed discovery of the fire. • There was a significant amount of combustible material in the room. The fire reached the large hall (10th floor) through the ceiling with sprinkler heads. Faulty construction of the floor slab (unsealed clearance) and inadequate fire resistance around the ducts and floor slab (deck plates). O Smoke Propagation Path The smoke propagated along with the spreading flames. The vertical shaft (stairwell) was not the direct path of propagation to the other floors because the origin of the fire was the 9th floor of the 10-story building, but because of that, the significant amount of smoke probably stalled on the top floor. II. Summary of the Building (1) Built Construction, Completion, and Major Renovations (Completion) October 1960, (Expansion) December 1965 Fire Prevention Management (3) Fire Prevention (2) Vertical Shafts The human resource manager was the fire-prevention Stairs [X] **Duct Spaces** [X] manager. [X] Pipe Shafts [X] Elevators The hotel had created and submitted a fire defense plan to Other ( ) [X] **Escalators** the local fire station. ° The hotel had organized an in-house firefighting team (50 The main stairwell (in the center of the building) did members). not have any fire compartment. The hotel carried out a fire drill at least once a year with the local fire station. (4) Fire Compartments (5) Firefighting Equipment The clearance holes in the floor slab were never The fire inspector pointed out that the automatic fire detection sealed (size of the holes: 35 x 2,700 mm). system of the East and South Buildings was partially incomplete. The floor slab of the 9th floor was constructed O The inspector also recommended replacing the guiding lights with a steel deck plate, which was not short on fire resistance. The fire inspector recommended according to standards. installing a fire compartment for the fire escape facilities in May 1969.

III. Actions Taken after Fire was Detected							
(1) First Detected	<ul><li>Detected by</li><li>How and wh</li><li>Action taker</li></ul>	y (The alarm sounded	( Night guard ) ( The alarm sounded from the control panel of the automatic fire detection system ) ( Firefighting and a 119 call after the fire location was confirmed )				
cted	Around 3 am, Night Guard I heard an alarm coming from the control panel of the automatic fire detection system when he was relaxing in his office after returning from his night patrol. he saw that the fire was on the 10th floor. On the way to confirm the fire, he met Night Guard N who was patrolling the 6th floor. After a quick briefing, Guard I went to confirm the fire location and tried to extinguish the fire, and Guard N ran down to notify the telephone operator of the fire. The fire location was already filled with heavy smoke. The origin of the fire was a closed storage room with no automatic fire detection system sensors; therefore, it took more than 1 hour for anyone to notice the fire.						
(2) Emergency Call	Emergency Call	Yes [X] (Telephone operator who was woken up by the guard made the 119 call.)  No [ ]					
	Guard N was on the way to the 5th floor when he heard the local fire alarm, and then on the way to the office on the 2nd floor, he met Guard I in front of the elevator. After talking briefly about what to do, Guard N continued to run down to the office on the 2nd floor and told the telephone operator to make a 119 call.						
(3) Initial Firefighting Activities	Initiated	Successful [ ] Failed [X]  Comparison of Extinguished timing Comparison of Firefighting difficulties Comparison of Firefighting method	[X] [ ] [ ]	(Reasons or Conditions)  Guard I rushed to the 10th floor and used the fire extinguisher to extinguish the fire; however, he went down to the 9th floor because of heavy smoke. Two hotel staff members joined him and used the indoor fire hydrant to spray water on the origin of the fire (the storage room on the 9th floor), but their attempts			
Activities	Not Initiated	<ul><li>Extinguished timing</li><li>Firefighting difficulties</li><li>Firefighting method</li><li>Other</li></ul>	[] [] []	failed because too much time had elapsed since the fire had emerged and the fire was already out of control. During this attempt, they used 3 indoor fire hydrants that were located the 8th to 10th floors.			
(4)	(Obstacles or Difficulties in Fire Control)						
(4) Summary of Firefighting Activities	<ul> <li>Because of the faulty floor slab that made the fire compartment incomplete, the 3 floors were engulfed in flames, which extended the area in which firefighting was needed to a much larger extent.</li> <li>The fire was already beyond the level where it could be controlled by portable devices, and the power outage on the 8th and above floors made firefighting efforts difficult.</li> </ul>						

## Means of Escape (No. of Persons) Obstacles to Evacuation (5) Evacuation o Stairs [ X ] (325) O No windows [ ] Elevators/Escalators [ ] ( ) O Barred openings [ ] Locked emergency doors (Exits) [ ] Partially o Escape equipment [ ] ( ) O Alarm system [ X] (Poorly controlled, Malfunctioned, O Directly to ground from windows or openings [ ]( ) Rescued [X] (3 employees were rescued from 9th floor) Not installed) Other (Guided, 2 people from 9th floor and 12 people O Power outage [X] (8th to 10th floors) Other[] from 8th floor) [X] (14)

The evacuees learned about the fire from the automatic fire detection system alarm and started to evacuate. Approximately 3 to 4 hotel employees were staying on each floor and they knocked on the guest rooms to wake the guests up. Because of the significant efforts of the employees in evacuating the guests, most of the guests and employees were able to escape via the main stairs in the center of the building. On the 7th and lower floors, the evacuees found their way out without confusion because they did not experience black out conditions. On the 8th and 9th floors, respectively, 5 and 12 evacuees were trapped because of heavy smoke and black out. The firefighters guided them out, except for 3 people who were rescued from the 9th floor.

(0)		Healthy individuals (Drunk persons )	Obstacles to Evacuation Obstacles to Evacuation					
Causalities	`	Individuals in need of assistance Infants Elderly Handicapped Patients/ill persons	<ul> <li>Barred openings []</li> <li>Locked emergency doors (Exits) []</li> <li>Alarm system [] (Poorly controlled, Malfunctioned, Not installed)</li> <li>Power outage []</li> <li>Other []</li> </ul>					
		None						

## IV. Issues and Lessons Learned

- 1. In order to verify that each clearance is adequately sealed, the post-construction inspection system needs to be more thorough and any defect should be corrected in a timely manner.
- 2. The cause of the fire spread was mainly the fallen duct (due to heat) that pierced through the floor of the fire compartment. To avoid this, it is necessary to develop some technical solutions for clearance sealing and fire-resistive support around a duct and other installations of similar nature.
- 3. Any floors constructed with steel deck plates need to be fire resistive.
- 4. The main East and South Buildings were constructed before the Fire Service Act became effective, so these buildings did not have any water pipe connections. If the hotel had installed them regardless of legal obligations, the firefighters could have utilized them to control the fire.
- 5. The fire broke out from a room that did not have any fire detectors, which resulted in delayed discovery and firefighting
- 6. The voluntarily installed sprinkler system did not work as expected because the fire came from the ceiling.