1. Summary			Building Name Address			Use (per FSA Annexed Table 1)	Date a of li	Date and Time of Incident			ture and ories rea	Extent of Damage (Damaged Area Total Area)	No. of Casualties
		Su  14 V ry of Fi	Sushi Yoshiroh Inn 1484 Wakaura、 Wakayama City, WAKAYAMA			Jan 2, 1971 Breakout at 01:03 (approx) Hotel (5) a Detected at 01:20 Notified by emergency call Extinguished by 03:25		P (( F B 4 g b B B V T	Partially wooden (Old Building) Fire resistive, partially steel frame (New Building) 4 stories above ground and 3 below Building area 1,056 m <sup>2</sup> Total floor area 2,749.06 m <sup>2</sup>		[All], Half, Partial, Smal 2,749.06 m <sup>2</sup> (100%) 2	Fatalities I 16 Injured 15 (4)	
(1) Summary	During the New Year's holiday period, on January 2nd, the hotel was completely destroyed by the fire that broke out or the 2nd floor of the building. The fire was detected late and the hotel was an old wooden structure with no fire compartments, which meant that the fire spread quickly. This fire resulted in 16 fatalities.								nat broke out on no fire				
(2) Conditions per Floor	Floo r	Total area Damaç area		ged a	d Use (Purpose)		No. of people		N fat	o. of alities	Fire escape equipment	Firefighting equipment	
	4 3 ② 1 B1 Total	M <sup>2</sup> Old Bldg 1,828	New Bldg 921.06 2.749.06	m <sup>2</sup> Old Ne 2,7	ww	Old Guest rooms Guest rooms Large hall, Office	New Guest rooms Hall, Bath	Old 25 20	New 12 12 5 74	Old 16	New	Inside stairs Fi 4 sets of rope ex ladders Sh 1 set of de evacuation Gi bridges 1 fixed ladder	Fire extinguishers Short circuit detector Guiding lights
(3) Origin of Fire	(Floor, Prese From entran ° The cor ° The stai	<ul> <li>(Floor, Room, Part, Combustibles, Habitable/Non-habitable Rooms, Present/Absent)</li> <li>From the north-west corner of the large hall next to the 2nd-floor entrance in the Old Building.</li> <li>The hallways and interiors of each room were mostly made of combustible materials such as plywood.</li> <li>The origin of the fire was next to the wooden large hall and the main stairwell leading to the 3rd and 4th floors.</li> </ul>							(4) Cause of Fire	Unknow	'n		

(Location of Fire Source) (Propagation from Source) Near the large Combustible interior hall on the 2nd floor of the Old Building	(Propagation to Upper Floors)       (Throughout the building)         Stairwell       Old wooden structure, combustible interior materials, and no fire compartments					
This fire originated in the north-west corner of the large hall next to the 2nd-floor entrance of the old building. Initially the fire mainly spread to the upper floors through the stairwell nearby and then spread horizontally on each of the 2nd to 4th floors. The spread to the lower floors (the 1st and basement floors) was caused by burning objects that fell through the collapsed floors.						
<ul> <li>O Main Reasons for Propagation of the Fire</li> <li>The origin of the fire was the wooden large hall (open space, plywood walls) and there were no fire compartment to prevent the fire from spreading.</li> <li>The stairwell was an open space where the thermal current could become concentrated and ascend the space easily.</li> <li>The detection of the fire was significantly delayed.</li> <li>O Smoke Propagation Path The 2 sets of open stairwells near the fire room became the smoke propagation path, and a large amount of heaves smoke ascended along this path. Once the smoke reached the uppermost area, it started descending gradually a became concentrated on each floor.</li> </ul>						
Summary of the Building Construction, Completion, and Major Renovations (Old Building) Constructed in the early 1920s (or 1910s) and expanded over the years. (New Building) February 1957						
(2) Vertical Shafts	(3) Fire Prevention					
Stairs[X]Duct Spaces[]Elevators[]Pipe Shafts[]Escalators[]Other ()[]	<ul> <li>The hotel director was the fire-prevention manager and had submitted a fire defense plan to the local fire station.</li> <li>The hotel proactively maintained employee training and fire drills with the local fire station.</li> <li>The last security patrol ended at midnight (00:00).</li> </ul>					
The stairwell was fully open type.						
(4) Fire Compartments	(5) Firefighting Equipment					
No fire wall or fire compartments over a 3,000m <sup>2</sup> area. The interior walls were made of plywood.	<ul> <li>The local fire station recommended the hotel to install an automatic fire detection system as soon as possible, and the hotel complied with this and made arrangements with the contractors to start the installation on January 10, 1971.</li> <li>The hotel was exempt from the installation of indoor fire hydrants.</li> </ul>					
	Near the large hall on the 2nd floor of the Old Building       Combustible interior materials         This fire originated in the north-west corner of the large fire mainly spread to the upper floors through the stair floors. The spread to the lower floors (the 1st and bas collapsed floors.         O Main Reasons for Propagation of the Fire         • The origin of the fire was the wooden large hall to prevent the fire from spreading.         • The detection of the fire was significantly delayed O Smoke Propagation Path The 2 sets of open stairwells near the fire room be smoke ascended along this path. Once the smoke became concentrated on each floor.         Summary of the Building         Construction, Completion, and Major Renovations (Old Building) Constructed in the early 1920s (or 1910         (2) Vertical Shafts         Stairs       [X]         Duct Spaces       []         Elevators       []         Pipe Shafts       []         Escalators       []         Other ()       []         The stairwell was fully open type.					

III	III. Actions Taken after the Fire was Detected								
(1) First Det	° Detected by       ( Hotel director's wife )         ° How and why       ( Unusual sound )         ° Action taken       ( Alerted by a shout of "Fire!" )								
ected	The hotel director's wife was asleep in her residence near the entrance on the 2nd floor and she heard an unusual noise coming from the <i>Satsuki</i> Room on the 3rd floor. When she came out to the hallway on the north side of her residence, she saw the fire in the vicinity of the stainwell that was located next to the large hall stage and leading to the 3rd and 4th floors. She alerted others by shouting "Fire!" and made a 119 call. She also unlocked the entrance on her way to notify the owner. After she alerted the 3rd floor of the New Building, she ran through the kitchen to the outside via the souvenir shop.								
(2) Eme	Emergency Call	Yes [X] ( Hotel Director's wit	fe)	Time elapsed since the discovery (17) minutes					
rgency Call									
(3) Ir		Successful [] Failed [X]		(Reasons or Conditions)					
nitial Firefighting Activities	<u>Initiated</u>	<ul> <li>Extinguished timing</li> <li>Firefighting difficulties</li> <li>Firefighting method</li> </ul>	[X] ]	Although a female maid and a male employee began pouring buckets of water on the fire, the fire was already beyond control by the time it was noticed, and therefore their attempts were ineffective.					
	Not Initiated• Extinguished timing[]• Firefighting difficulties[]• Firefighting method[]• Other[]		]	Those helping to extinguish the fire evacuated the building once they realized that they could not control it, and they did not have the time to alert the guests on the upper floors of the fire.					
(4)	(Obstacles or Difficulties in Fire Control)								
) Summary of Firefighting Activities	<ul> <li>By the time the first firefighters arrived, the Old Building was fully engulfed in fire, which was spreading to the souvenir shop and dining hall on the west side of the fire building. By the time all the firefighters arrived, the entire building was in flames and search and rescue activities were no longer feasible.</li> <li>Although the building was surrounded by the ocean, the fire engines could not drive up close enough to pump up the seawater; therefore, firefighters had to find other ways to secure water a long distance from the hotel. A structure built on the steeply inclined shoreline would have secured effective space or a connection that would have enabled the fire vehicles to utilize the seawater.</li> </ul>								

(5	Means of Escape (No. of Persons)		Obstacles to Evacuation				
) Evacuation	<ul> <li>Stairs []()</li> <li>Elevators/Escalators []()</li> <li>Escape equipment []()</li> <li>Directly to ground from windows or ope</li> <li>Rescued []()</li> <li>Other()[]()</li> </ul>	enings [X]()	<ul> <li>No windows []</li> <li>Barred openings []</li> <li>Locked emergency doors (Exits) []</li> <li>Alarm system [X] (Poorly controlled, Malfunctioned, <u>Not installed</u>)</li> <li>Power outage []</li> <li>Other []</li> </ul>				
	The guest rooms were located on the 3rd and 4th floors of the Old Building and the 1st and 2nd floors of the New Building. The guests who were on the fire floor and below the Old Building were able to evacuate safely. Two guests from the 3rd floor escaped via the stairs, with the rest evacuating to the rooftop from the windows. From the 4th floor, some of the guests jumped from windows or evacuated to the roof. All 25 guests on the 4th floor were victims of this fire: 16 fatalities, 4 severely injured and 5 injured. The 2nd floor of the New Building was lower than that of the Old Building, so the hotel staff members were able to lead the guests to the emergency exit through the hallway.						
(6	Healthy individuals 16	Obstacles to Evacuation					
) Cau	(Drunk persons )	• No windows [ ]					
salit	Individuals in need of assistance	<ul> <li>Barred openings [ ]</li> <li>Locked emergency doors (Exits) [ ]</li> </ul>					
Elderly • Alarm System [X] (Poorly controlled, Malfunctioned, No							
	Handicapped  Power outage [ ]						
	Patients/III persons	• Other[]					
	As mentioned, 16 of the 19 guests staying on the 4th floor were killed in this fire. Of the 16 fatalities, 7 of them were for in the hallway; the rest (8) were found in the guest rooms. The 1 other person was the guest staying in the <i>Chidori</i> Ro on the 4th floor. S/he fell from the roof when jumping from the window onto the roof with 3 other friends (the friends survived).						
IV.	Issues and Lessons Learned						
1.	1. To protect lives in a hotel fire, it is important to detect the fire as early as possible and to do this, the hotel should have installed an automatic fire detection system without delay. In addition, it is necessary to improve security measures and maintain all necessary manpower and equipment.						
2.	2. The Japanese Building Standard Law requires a 2-way evacuation route in structures as large as this hotel. However, it would be more proactive if each room had a 2-way evacuation route by means of evacuation hardware such as rope ladders.						
3.	Before making any addition or modification to an existing building that holds an unspecified number of people, the existing portion should be reviewed in order to preserve a simpler evacuation route and/or to ensure fireproof or fire-preventive means, and this should be reinforced by direction or guidance from governmental or regulatory authorities. In addition, building owners should be advised to maintain a consistent plan that is also applicable to future additions and madifications.						
4.	In this fire, the firefighters could not utilize seawater because the accessible space was very limited for the fire vehicle to park and pump it up; therefore, effective space should be secured along the coastline for firefighting operations.						







the 3rd floor