		Building Name Address		Use (as per FSA Annexed Table 1)	as per FSA Date and Time Annexed of Incident		Structure Stories Area		e vrea/ (No. of Casualties	
		Taiyo Department Store		Department	Nov. 29, 1973 Breakout at 13:15 (approx.) Noticed at 13:23		Fire resisti 9 stories above grou and 1 belo Building au	und All, <u>Hal</u> w Partial, Sr		Fatalities 103	
		1-3-10 Shimotori, Kumamoto, KUMAMOTO		(4) Not em		ed at 13:23 ed by gency call guished by	2,170 Total floor area 19.074	(66 %)		Injured 121 (15)	
I. 9	Summary	of Fire Incider	nt								
(1) Summary	The fire was one of the most catastrophic fire disasters in the history of building fires in Japan. Fire safety measures and management were neglected while the department store carried on business and new construction at the same time. This fire gave crucial momentum to the Construction Standard Law and the Fire Service Law pertaining to firefighting equipment such as sprinkler systems and to existing buildings that need retroactive adjustments from the aspect of fire safety.										
(2) (Floor	Total area	Damaged area	Use (Purp	ose)	No. of persons	Fatalities	Fire escape equipment		efighting uipment	
ònditi	PH4-1	450,492 m ²	450,492 m ²	Machine ro	om	18	M= male F= female	7 sets of	Fire	uichere	
(2) Conditions per Floor	9	504.9	504.9	Under construction (Culture cen		10		· inside stairs (B1 floor to PH1, B1 to 7 th	Indooi hydrai		
loor	8	1,100.773	1,110.777	Under construction (Office)		51	1(M)	floor, B1 to 4 th floor, B1 to 1 st floor, 1st to	Water conne		
	7	2,084.47	2,084.47	Restaurant, Event hall		257	29 (M8, F21)	2 nd floors, 2nd to 8th floors,		system	
	6	2,084.47	2,084.47	Furniture		69	31 (M10, F21)	and 1st to 8 th floors)	(PA sy	(PA system)	
	5	2,084.47	2,084.47	Sporting goods, Toys, Office supplies		114	1(M)		* Refe	er to (5)	
	4	2,109.46 2,162.7 Women's clothing		-	82		ļ				
	3	2,162.7		Furniture, K		103		ļ			
	2	2,162.7		Men's clothi	ng	137		1			
	1	2,170.85 Household			137		•				
	B1	2,159.158	40 504 705	Groceries		169	400				
Total 19,074.443 12.581.735 1,166 103 (Bior, Room, Part, Combustibles, Habitable/Non-habitable rooms, Present/Absent) Unknown From the 2nd-floor landing of the Stairs C Large amounts of combustible materials (bedding goods and clothing) were piled up on the steps in the stairwell. Image: Comparison of the steps in the stairwell.						1					

()	(Location of Fire Source) (Propagation from Sourc	e) (Propagation to Adjacent Zones) (Propagation to Other Floors)					
(5) Fire Propagation Path	2nd-floor landing of Stairs C lignited combustible materials that were piled in the stairwell	Spread to bedding goods piled on the 3rd-floor landing of Stairs CSpread to the top floor through unclosed fire doors and shutters in the stairwells and the escalators					
ath	bedding goods on the sales floor of the 3rd floor. Three escalator, the fire further spread rapidly to the upper On Stairs C, the shutter for the 6th floor and the side propagated to the sales floors on the 6th and 7th floor not close at all on the 4th floor; therefore, the fire spread the shutters from the 4th to 7th floors did not close. Or	door for the 7th floor did not close, and therefore the fire rs. On Stairs D, the shutter closed partially on the 3rd floor, but did ad from the sales floor of the 3rd floor to the 4th floor. On Stairs A, in the escalator in the center of the floor, the shutter did not close on e destroyed all the floors above the 3rd floor. Fire also propagated					
	 O Main Reasons for Propagation of the Fire The fire spread quickly because of the large amounts of combustible sales goods placed in the stairwells front of and behind the fire shutters. The fire propagated toward the center of the building through the openings of the stairwells and escalator la most of the fire doors and shutters remained open. O Smoke Propagation Path Heavy smoke was produced in Stairs C and ascended rapidly up the stairwell to the 7th floor, descending to floor gradually. Once the flames had reached the sales floor of the 3rd floor, the smoke ascended along the stairwells and the escalator and propagated to each of the upper floors almost simultaneously. 						
II.	I. Summary of the Building						
(1) Built	Construction, Completion, and Major Renovations (Completion) July 1951 (Expansion) February 1956 (Under Construction) since November 1973						
Fir	(2) Vertical Shafts	(3) Fire Prevention					
Fire Prevention	Stairwells[X]Duct Spaces[X]Elevators[X]Pipe Shafts[X]Escalators[X]Other ()[]	 A fire-prevention manager was appointed, and the paper work had been submitted to the local fire station, but the fire defense plan was not prepared nor was a fire drill held. Store management was unconcerned about fire prevention. 					
n Management	^o The vertical shafts were protected by fire compartments, but most of the fire shutters for the stairwells and escalators did not close because of poor maintenance. Only 7 of 23 shutters closed properly.	 The repeated warnings from the local fire station regarding maintenance of fire equipment were completely disregarded. The building was windowless because most of the windows were boarded up. 					
	 Most of the side doors next to the fire shutters were locked for security reasons. 						
	(4) Fire Compartments	(5) Firefighting Equipment					
	There was no fire compartment for the sales floor for an area of 1,500 m ² .	^o The firefighting equipment, including an automatic fire detection system, sprinkler system, escape equipment, and guiding lights, were nonfunctional because these were being installed at the time.					

III	III. Actions Taken after the Fire was Detected							
(1) First Detected	° Detected by (Construction worker) ° How and why (Flames and white smoke) ° Action taken (Alerted others)							
etected	^o Two construction workers were painting the exterior wall of the building. Around 10 to 15 minutes after 1 pm, they were roping up a bucket to the rooftop using an anchored pulley. When the bucket came around the 4th floor, they saw some white smoke emerging from the windows of the 3rd floor on Stairs C and suddenly a flame 50 cm in length burst out, breaking the window glass. They immediately alerted people around them.							
	Around 13:10, when 3 store clerks were chatting in the bedding goods section on the 3rd floor, they some white smoke in between a stack of the futon mattresses and the ceiling near the shutter for Stairs C. They thought that something was on fire and went to have closer look. They then saw grayish smoke ascending from the lower portion of the stairwell and flames near the landing. After they notified the 3rd-floor supervisor of the fire, they called the telephone operator from the internal telephone and told her to make a 119 call.							
(2		Yes [] () Time elapsed since the discovery (8) minutes						
) En	Emergency Ca	II No [X] (The owner of the barbers shop across the street made the 119 call)						
(2) Emergency Call	The owner of a barbers shop across the street heard a scream from outside. As soon as he came outside, he noticed flames and grayish smoke coming from the 3rd floor of the department building and made a 119 call from his shop.							
Call	* Later the telephone operator who was notified of the fire by the store clerks on the 3rd floor testified that s/he relayed the message to his/her supervisor and the supervisor made a 119 call; however, the fire station have no record of receiving any incoming call from the department store.							
(3)		Successful [] Failed [X] (Reasons or Conditions)						
(3) Initial Firefighting Activities	<u>Initiated</u>	 A construction worker and tax-stand worker at the entrance to the 1st floor ran up Stairs C and confirmed burning cardboard boxes near the landing of the 2nd floor. They tried to extinguish the fire with a hand-pumping extinguisher, but the water pressure was insufficient and they did not know how to use a dry-chemical extinguisher. By the time an increased number of buckets was being relayed by hand, the fire was already too 						
	Not Initiated	 Extinguished timing Firefighting difficulties Firefighting method Other Other The full of the fu						
(4) Summary of Firefighting Activities								

(5)	Means of Escape (No. of Persons)	Obstacles to Evacuation				
(5) Evacuation	 Stairs [X]() Elevators/Escalators []() Escape equipment []() Directly to ground from windows or openings []() Rescued [X]() Other()[]() 	 No windows [X] (boarded up) Barred openings [] Locked emergency doors (Exits) [] Alarm system [X] (Poorly controlled, <u>Malfunctioned</u>, Not installed) Power outage [X] Other [] 				
		nost of the people inside the building did not become aware of use the automatic fire detection system was not functioning no emergency announcement via the PA system.				
	Refer to Section 1 of the Attachment for the details of the	evacuation and rescue activities on each floor.				
(6) Causalities	Healthy individuals 103 (Drunk persons) Obstacles to Evacuation Individuals in need of assistance Infants Elderly Handicapped Patients/ill persons No windows [X] (boarded up) Barred openings [] Locked emergency doors (Exits) [] Alarm system [X] (Poorly controlled, <u>Malfunctioned</u> , Not installed) Power outage [X] Potients/ill persons Other []					
	no guiding lights or emergency lights. Moreover, most of the windows were boarded up. Refer to Section 2 of the Attachment for the location of the fatalities and the analysis.					
IV.	IV. Issues and Lessons Learned					
Refer to Section 3 of the Attachment.						

Attachment

1. Details of the evacuation and rescue operations on each floor

[3rd floor]

- ① Approximately 10 employees used the escalator to descend to the 2nd floor and then ran down Stairs A to the 1st floor.
- 2 With the employees' assistance, 56 persons (customers and employees) ran down Stairs A.
- ③ Via Stairs B, 4 employees who helped in the initial firefighting activities and 3 telephone operators evacuated.

[4th floor]

- ① From Stairs B, 23 employees evacuated.
- ② The construction workers rescued 15 people by knocking out a window in the bathroom and the north-side door on Stairs B that led to the construction site.
- ③ The electricians rescued a few people by knocking down a door (plywood) in the north-east corner of the floor.

[5th floor]

- ① Through the north-side door on Stairs B, approximately 22 employees evacuated to the construction site.
- ② Firefighters rescued a few individuals by knocking out the window of the employee bathroom, which was accessible from the landing of Stairs B.
- ③ A few employees and customers evacuated via a connecting corridor to another building.
- ④ From the window of the east-south corner, 2 employees jumped down to the arcade's roof, and 1 of them climbed down a plastic water hose that was thrown by someone.

[6th floor]

- ① Two employees descended via Stairs B to the 5th floor and then escaped to the construction site through the door on the north side of the floor.
- ② By breaking through the plywood on the north-side wall, 4 escalator workers escaped to the construction site, followed by 1 female employee.
- ③ From a window in the south-east corner, 1 person was rescued to the arcade roof by rope. Also through use of a rope, 4 people were rescued by a snorkel truck.

[7th floor]

- ① With help from the employees, 60 employees and 70 customers escaped to the roof from the stairs leading to the roof portion of the 8th floor.
- 2 With the help of construction workers, approximately 10 customers escaped from Stairs A.
- ③ The construction workers rescued 1 person by knocking down the door for Stairs B.

[8th floor (Roof floor)]

- ① 67 persons were rescued by ladder truck.
- ② Using the construction scaffolding on the south side, 25 persons escaped.
- ③ Using a slow descending device, 6 people landed on the roof of the arcade and 2 people landed on the ground and were rescued.
- ④ 60 people were rescued to the construction site.


Flo	S	Ē	Construction workers	Gender					
Floor (Total fatalities)	Customersr	Employees		Male	Female	Location of the fatalities	Probable path and circumstances		
8 Total		1		1		In between 7th to the roof floor of Stairs K	Probably 1 of the evacuees from the 6th floor who was the last person waiting to be		
		1	1	2		In between 7th and 8th floor on Stairs K	rescued.		
7	13	11		4	9 11	In front of Stairs A, 24 people collectively	Trapped (people who were originally on the 7th floor or ascended from other floors).		
(29)	1	1		2		Landing of Stairs A	Unable to find Stairs K and trapped while running away from the 7th and 4th floors.		
		1			1	Entrance to Stairs B	Trapped while running away from the 6th floor.		
Total	14	14	1	8	21		Trapped while running away from the special event (Hokkaido Exhibition) on the 7th floor.		
	21	4		7	4 14	25 collective fatalities in the east-south corner			
6 (31)	2	2		1	1	4 fatalities near the west-center wall to outside	Overcome by smoke and heat on Stairs A, C, and E.		
	1		1	1		2 fatalities near the south wall to outside	Trapped on Stairs A and C. Overcome by smoke and heat on Stairs A, C,		
Total	24	6	1	10	21		and E.		
5			1	1		In front of Stairs A	Trapped while running away from the 3rd floor.		
	8	21		3 2	18 6	29 people on Stairs B	Most of them were from the 4th floor and were		
4 (40)	1	8		2	1 6	9 fatalities in front of Stairs B	overcome by heat and smoke.		
	1	1		2		Center and north-east side	Stairs B.		
Total	10	30		9	31		Trapped by the walls to the construction site.		
3		1		1		In front of Stairs B	People from the 3rd floor, trapped while running away toward the south-east corner.		
Total 103	48	52	3	30	73				

2. Location of the fatalities and probable circumstances

3. IV. Issues and Lessons Learned


(1) This fire occurred in a department store that holds an unspecified number of people and a large amount of combustible material that was on display, stored, and sold. In such an environment, a fire should be able to be contained in the incipient stage, otherwise many people will become victims of fast spreading fire and smoke.


- (2) Even if a tall building were constructed with multiple stairs in easy-to-locate places, many people could die unless the stairs are equipped with a smokeproof system, because people will have to evacuate from the upper floors within a short period of time, otherwise pervasive smoke will ascend rapidly from the lower floors and make evacuation impossible.
- (3) No special escape stairs or outside stairs will be safe or effective if the doors are locked or blocked for maintenance or security reasons. Any stairs will be meaningless if a vertical duct that could become an ascending path for pervasive smoke runs along the escape route to the stairs or if the stairwell is next to a defective opening.
- (4) Notification of any fire should be conveyed immediately and accurately, especially to upper floors if it occurs on a lower floor, otherwise people will lose the chance to escape and be trapped by sudden smoke which creates chaos and leads to death.
- (5) The main cause of the great number of fatalities appears to be poor management that allowed the staircase to be a showcase for sales goods. In addition, the side doors next to the fire shutters on the fire escape stairs were locked and the shutters did not close because of objects placed under or near them. Given this case, store management should maintain necessary measures in a more safety-oriented manner so that the lives of people can be protected in case of an emergency.
- (6) A department store will be particularly vulnerable if any construction is carried out alongside normal business operations. This fire occurred while the fire preventive equipment was being renovated alongside expansion construction. At that time, the safest outside stairs were removed and the remaining passage was blocked by a stack of combustible goods, which allowed the fire to propagate faster, making evacuation difficult.





----- Smoke propagation path


* Refer to plane view for details of casualties





























Fatalities: o1 males

